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--IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No. 19398

-vJEFFREY McINTYRE ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following
1.

are presented in this appeal:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to

support defendant's conviction for theft by deception.
2.

Whether the trial court's refusal to give

defendant's requested instruction concerning pecuniary loss
was error.

3.

Whether the

court erred in refusing to

give defendant's requested instruction on "puffing."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jeffrey Mcintyre Roberts, was charged
by information with theft by deception, a second degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405 and 412 (1978) (R,
21.

After a jury trial on May 4 and 6, 1983, defendant was

found guilty of the charged offense.

On May 27, 1983,

defendant was sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years in the

Utah State Prison and ordered to make restitution (R.
99-100). On June 6, 1983, Judge Bullock granted defendant's
application for a certificate of probable cause and set bail
at $10,000 (R. 108-109).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial, many of the facts were in dispute.

The

facts which support the verdict are as follows.
In 1978, the State's primary witness, David Rail,
sold a life insurance policy to Miriam Marlowe (R. 176).
Ms. Marlowe's husband died in a swimming accident in JL.y of
1981.

In March of 1982, Mr. Rail began processing an

insurance claim on that accident for the named beneficiary,
Ms. Marlowe, who, under the provisions of the policy, was
entitled to approximately $50,000 (R. 177).

Mr. Rail

contacted Ms. Marlowe, a resident of California, and
informed her that she would receive $50,000, but that only
$38,000 would be paid initially because California law
required one-fourth of the proceeds to be retained pending
final settlement of the estate (R. 181).
During the time Mr. Rail was processing the claim,
he mentioned the $50,000 sum to be paid to Ms. Marlowe to
John Walton, a friend who had an office in the same building
(R. 179).

Defendant learned of the money that Mr. Rail was

to pay Ms. Marlowe while present during a discussion of the
matter between Rail and Walton (R. 179).

Several days

later, defendant approached Mr. Rail and asked him if he
might be interested in convincing Ms. Marlow to invest the
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insurance proceeds (R. 179).

riefendant told Rail that he

had a friend who worked for the State Department and had
access to gold in Brazil.

The gold could be purchased in

srazil for $100 an ounce and sold in the United States for
approximately $300 an ounce (R. 180).
Mr. Rail then flew to California and personally
delivered the check for $38,000 to Miriam Marlowe (R. 187),
At that time, Mr. Rail explained to Ms. Marlowe that she
could invest the insurance proceeds and double her money (R.

183).

He related to her defendant's

about a South

American gold connection who could buy gold for $100 an
ounce and sell it in the United States for $300 an ounce.
she would double her money, and Mr. Rail and defendant would
divide the remainder as payment for their services (R, 183).
Ms. Marlowe agreed to invest some of her money,
but only if she could get some security or guarantee (T.

185).

Mr. Rail discussed the wisdom of the investment with

an attorney, who advised him not to invest the money unless
some security were obtained (R. 296).
After Mr. Rail contacted defendant and discussed
securing the investment, defendant offered a building lot
located in Sherwood Hills in Utah County as security.

He

represented to Mr. Rail that the lot was free and clear (R.

185).

Based on these representations, Mr. Rail agreed to go

through with the investment for his client, Ms. Marlowe.

-3-

However, a title search performed at Mr. Rail's
request before the deal was closed revealed that the
property was not free and clear as defendant had represented
(R. 189).

There was a $6,200 tax lien present and the

property was in default in the amount of $16,000 (R. 189,
216, 270, 281).

When Mr. Rail confronted defendant with

this information, defendant assured him that he would clear
the title by the following Tuesday (R. 191).

Ba"sed upon

this assurance, Mr. Rail decided to invest Ms. Marlowe's
money.
Mr. Rail contacted a title company and asked •·
person there to draft documents for a transaction involving
land used as security for a cash investment.

On April 15,

1982, Mr. Rail and defendant met at the title company.
However, defendant refused to sign a trust deed for the
property he had offered as security, insisting that the
title company prepare a warranty deed instead.

He told Mr.

Rail that a warranty deed was better security than a trust
deed (R. 285).

Although the use of a warranty deed under

these circumstances was somewhat unusual (R. 286), the deal
was closed.
On the same day as the closing, defendant informed
Mr, Rail that there had been a change of plan concerning
delivery of Ms. Marlowe's money.

Originally, both Mr. Rail

and defendant were to fly to Brazil and give the money to
the State Department official there (R. 195).

However,

defendant now said that the State Department official's
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wife, who lived in Salt Lake City, was going to fly to
srazil.

Defendant suggested that he would deliver the money

to her and thus save the expense of flying to Brazil (R.
19 6, 198).

Based upon these representations, Mr. Rail gave

defendant a check made payable to JARCO in the amount of
$24,861 ($25,000 less the cost of the title search).
oefendant explained that JARCO was the name of the
corporation set up by the people in Brazil to handle income
from their gold transactions (R. 197-198).
company with defendant that day with
defendant would deliver

Mr. Rail parted

understanding that

Marlowe's money to the wife of

the Brazilian gold connection (R. 198).
In July of 1982, Mr. Rail discovered that the
property defendant conveyed as security was in default and
subject to a sheriff's sale (R. 201).

In an effort to

preserve his client's equity interest in the security, Mr.
Rail personally borrowed $16,000 and purchased the property
after it had been sold at the sheriff's sale (R. 236).
After repeated efforts to recover Ms. Marlowe's money from
defendant had failed, Mr. Rail contacted the Utah County
Attorney's Office.
The County Attorney's investigation revealed that
on April 16, 1982, defendant opened an account at the
Midvale Branch of Tracy-Collins Bank in the name of Jeffrey
Mcintyre Roberts, d/b/a JARCO, and deposited Ms. Marlowe's
money in th is account ( R. 298, 291).

-5-

On April 17,

defendant withdrew $12,000 cash from the account (R. 304).
Defendant testified that expenditures made with money from
this account were "pretty much" personal expenditures and
that no attempt was made to invest the money in Brazilian
gold ( R. 369).
By the date of trial, Ms. Marlowe had not received
any of the $25,000 she had given defendant.

She held title

to the "security" property only after her agent incurred a
debt of $16,000 to secure the title.

The tax liens

remained.·

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence was sufff icient to support
defendant's conviction for theft by deception in that the
State proved both the statutory elements of theft by
deception and the additional element of pecuniary loss
required for the crime by State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48
(Utah 1983).

However, this Court should abandon the

pecuniary loss requirement announced in Johnson and adopt
the majority rule.
The trial court did not err in refusing to give
defendant's requested jury instruction concerning pecuniary
loss to the victim.

That instruction is not required under

the majority, and better, rule.
Finally, the trial court did not err in refusing
to give defendant's requested instruction concerning
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•puffing".

The evidence simply did not support the giving

of that instruction.
this regard,

Alternatively, if there was error in

it was harmless error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR THEFT BY
DECEPTION.
Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at
trial was insufficient to establish
by deception.

he commited theft

As support 'for this argument, he cites

v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983).

Based upon language

contained in that opinion, defendant contends that although
he was guilty of wrongful conduct in taking Ms. Marlowe's
money and not investing it in the gold scheme, the State
failed to prove that the victim lost something of value
(i.e., suffered a pecuniary.loss) and thus his conviction
for theft by deception cannot stand.

He points to evidence

which he contends demonstrates that Ms. Marlowe received a
piece of property with an equity value of approximately
$25,000 by operation of the security arrangement insisted

upon by Ms. Marlowe before she invested her $25,000 cash.
Thus, he concludes, "[s]he received exactly what the parties
intended for her to receive should [defendant] fail to
obtain the gold."

Appellant's Brief at p. 11.
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I

\

In Johnson, this Court reversed a theft by
deception conviction because the State "failed to prove
-beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the
criminal offense of theft by deception, namely, that [the
victim] failed to get what it bargained for or that it
sustained a pecuniary loss."
added).

663 P.2d at 51 (emphasis

There, the Court applied the current theft by

deception statute, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-405(1) ·(1978),

which states:
A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises control over property of
·
another by deception and with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
The Court said that one of the essential elements
necessary to sustain a conviction under that statute is the
following:
[A]n actual fraud must have to be
perpe trated in the sense that something
of value was obtained and the victim lost
something of value • • • •
663 P.2d at 50 (citations omitted).

It then noted its past

elaboration on that element:
The actual fraud and prejudice required,
however, is determined according to the
situation of the victim immediately after
he parts with his property.
If he gets
what was pretended and what he bargained
for there is no fraud or prejudice.
Id.

(emphasis in original)

(citations omitted).

In reviewing the information filed by the State
and the instructions given to the jury at trial (see
Instructions #3 and #5, R. 69, 71, attached as Appendix A),
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it is apparent that the State sought to establish theft by
deception based upon the "deception" defined in Utah Code
Mn·

76-6-401( 5) (e)

(1978), which reads:

(5)
"Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(e)
Promises performance that is likely
to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor
does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed; provided, however, that
failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor
did not intend to perform or knew the
promise would not be
under that definition the evidence was sufficient to support
defendant's conviction, in that it showed that defendant
obtained or exercised control over Ms. Marlowe's money with
the purpose to deprive her thereof by representing that he
would invest the money in a gold scheme and would clear
title on the land used to secure the transaction--promised
performance which the jury could have reasonably inferred
from the evidence defendant did not intend to perform or
knew would not be performed.

Clearly, defendant's

representations that he would do those two things affected
Ms. Marlowe's judgment concerning her investment.
they were a fundamental part of the transaction.

In fact,
Thus, by

the terms of the relevant statutes, defendant's conduct
constituted theft by deception.
The question, therefore, is whether the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that Ms. Marlowe

-9-

suffered a pecuniary loss.

Al though the Johnson opinion

mixes the concepts of "loss of something of value," "failure
to get what one bargained for," and "pecuniary loss" in a
somewhat confusing manner, it appears the Court held that in
addition to the applicable statutory elements of theft by
deception, the State must prove that the victim did not
receive what was bargained for and that a pecuniary loss was
sustained.

Johnson, 663 P.2d at 51 (see,

C.J,

Hall, concurring and dissenting) .
. There is little doubt that Ms. Marlowe did not
receive what she bargained for--i.e., an opportunity
double her money in the gold scheme and an unencumbered
piece of property as security for her investment.

Looking

at "the situation of the victim immediately after she
part[ed] with [her] property," Johnson, 663 P.2d at 50
(quoting State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 75, 262 P. 294, 296
(1927)), it is clear that Ms. Marlowe was defrauded,
Defendant obtained her money (something of value), and she
lost not only her money but also the opportunity to double
it--losses that clearly constitute pecuniary losses (or loss
of something of value).
Nevertheless, defendant argues that Ms. Marlowe
did not suffer a pecuniary loss, as required by Johnson,
because she received land with an equity value of "somewhere
in the neighborhood of $25,000" when defendant failed to
invest her money in gold.

Appellant's Brief at p. 10.
-10-

Although it is not clear from the record that Ms. Marlowe
sought to secure her investment in anticipation of the
possibility that defendant would not invest her money in the
gold scheme as he said he would, even if it were assumed
that that was the arrangement, Ms. Marlowe suffered a
pecuniary loss as a result of the transaction.

She gave her

money to defendant with the understanding that it would be
secured by unencumbered land whose value appears to have
been in excess of $25, 000 ( R. 224-225)
Brief at p. 10).

(see Appellant's

argument that the property's

market value of $38,000 to $50,000 minus $16,000 in
encumbrances left Ms. Marlowe whole and with no pecuniary
loss (i.e., "[s]he received exactly what the parties
intended for her to receive should defendant fail to obtain
the gold" Appellant's Brief at p. 11) is without merit.l
First, Ms. Marlowe did not receive the unencumbered
land she bargained for as

Second, she suffered a

pecuniary loss amounting to the difference between the value
of the land in an unencumbered condition, as promised, and
the value of the encumbered land she received at the time
she parted with her money.
76-6-401(5)(d)

(1978).

Cf.

Utah Code Ann. S

The critical inquiry is not whether

1 Even if the premise of defendant's argument were
accepted, if one were to subtract $16,000 from $38,000 (the
low estimate of market value) the remainder would be
$22,000--a figure $3,000 less than the $25,000 Ms. Marlowe
invested.
It is beyond dispute that the $3,000 difference
would constitute a pecuniary loss.
-11-

the land may have been worth the $25,000 Ms. Marlowe
invested, but whether she received what she bargained for
and if she did not, whether a pecuniary loss was suffered as
a result.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and
taking those facts which can reasonably be inferred from it,
was sufficient to support defendant's convictiorr.

See

state v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982).
evidence

The

was not so lacking and

that a

reasonable person could not possibly have determined
a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of theft by
deception.

Id.

The State proved both the statutory

elements of theft by deception and the additional element of
pecuniary loss required for that crime by State v. Johnson.
Although the requirements of the statute and the
additional requirement of Johnson were satisfied in this
case, the Court should reexamine its conclusion in Johnson
that the showing of a pecuniary loss to the victim is an
essential element of theft by deception.

That conclusion

does not appear to be consistent with the terms of the theft
by deception statute or with the better view adopted by a
majority of courts.
In Utah, the crime of theft by deception is
similar to that defined in a predecessor statute to
§

76-6-405 termed "false pretenses."

50.

Johnson, 663 P.2d at

The statutes of the various states that recognize the

crime, although not uniform, have enough in common to
-12-

suggest the following definition:
The crime of false pretenses is knowingly
and designedly obtaining the property of
another by means of untrue representations
of fact with intent to defraud.
PERKINS AND BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 364 (3d ed. 1982).
Neither

§

76-6-405 nor the related definitional

section, S 76-6-401, contains any requirement that the
victim suffer a pecuniary loss before a conviction for theft
by deception may be had.

The Johnson Court grafted that

requirement onto the statute.

However, such a requirement

is not in accordance with what appears t'o be the majority
position in this country.

That position and the reasons

underlying it are set forth in State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377,
396 P.2d 5 (1964):

Although there is authority for the
the proposition that an actuil financial
loss is necessary to constitute the crime
of theft by false pretenses, see Daniel v.
State, 63 Ga. App. 12, 10 S.E.2d 80 (1940)1
McGee v. State, 97 Ga. 199, 22 S.E. 589 (1895),
we think the better rule is that there is no
requirement that the victim suffer a pecuniary loss so long as he has parted with his
property. Nelson v. united States, 97 u.s.
App. D.C. 6, 227 F.2d 21, 53 A.L.R.2d 1206,
(D.C.Cir. 1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 910,
76 s.ct. 700, loo L.Ed. 1445 (1956)1 People
v. Talbott, 65 Cal. App. 2d 654, 151 P.2d
317 (1944) 1 United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d
747 (2d Cir. 1932). The defendants focus
on the wrong part of the transaction. They
direct attention to what the victim obtains.
The gist of the offense, however, is conerned
with what the deftauder obtains. Once the
victim has parted with his property in
reliance on a false representation, it is
immaterial whether whatever he got in return
is equal in exchange value to that with which

-13-

he parted.
follows:

Judge

Hand put it as

"A man is none the less cheated out
of his property, when he is induced to
part with it by fraud, because he gets
a quid pro quo of equal value.
It may
be impossible to llleasure his loss by
the gross scales available to a court,
but he has suffered a wrong; he has
lost his chance to bargain with the
facts before him. That is the evil
against which the statute is directed."
united States v. Rowe, supra at 749.
96 Ariz. at 381, 396 P.2d at 8.
adhere to this position.

Numerous jurisdictions

See, e.g.,

United States v.

Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 534-535 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 u.s. 918, 100 s.ct. 1281, 63 L.Ed. 2d 603;
Nelson v. United States, 227 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
state v. Kennedy, 314 N.W.2d 884, 887 n.l (Wis. App. 1981);
Quidley v. Commonwealth, 221 va. 963, 966, 275 S.E.2d 622,
625 (1981); Clemons v. united States, 400 A.2d 1048, 1050
n.2 (D.C. App. 1977); Paulk v. State, 355 So.2d 304, 305
(Fla. App. 1977); People v. Talbott, 65 Cal. App. 2d 654,
659, 151 P.2d 317, 320 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 845,
65 S.Ct. 677, 89 L.Ed. 1406; State v. Sargent, 97 P.2d 692,
693 (Wash. 1940). See also PERKINS AND BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
383 (3d ed. 1982); TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW§ 422, at
499 (14th ed. 1980).
The rule expressed in Mills represents the better
view because it properly focuses attention on the
defendant's fraudulent conduct--conduct which the law of
false pretenses and theft by deception is designed to

-14-

punish.

Whether the victim actually suffers a pecuniary

loss should be immaterial.

2a at 659, 151 P.2d at 320.

People v. Talbott, 65 Cal. App.
The inquiry is limited to

determining whether the defendant fraudulently obtained the
victim's property with the intent to deprive him thereof.
In other

words, was the victim deprived of what he

bargained for

the defendant obtain or exercise

control over the victim's property by means of deception,
state v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), with the
intent to withhold the

permanently.

618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980).

State v.

Significantly, not

requiring that a pecuniary loss be shown appears to be more
consistent than is State v. Johnson with State v. Casperson,

71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294 (1927), which was cited with approval
in Johnson and where this Court said:
That a pretense false in fact and an
actual fraud resulting in prejudice are
essential
of the crime in question,
and must be proved to establish guilt, are
general principles of law which we recognize
and approve.
The actual fraud and prejudice
required, however, is determined according to
the situation of the victim immediately after
he parts with his property.
If he gets what
was pretended and what he bargained for,
there is no fraud or prejudice. But if he then
stands without the right or thing it was pretended he would then have, he has been defrauded
and preJudiced by reason of the false pretense,
and the offense is complete, notwithstanding
thereafter he may regain his property, or the
person obtaining
or another compensates him,
or he thereafter obtains full redress in some
manner not contemplated when he parted with
his property

71 Utah at 75, 262 P. at 296 (emphasis added}.
-15-

Therefore, this Court should abandon the pecuniary
loss requirement announced in Johnson and bring Utah law in
line with the majority, and better, view.

The result in

Johnson would not be different under the majority rule, the
"victim" there having received everything it bargained for.
Johnson, 663 P.2d at 50-51.

Moreover, dropping the

pecuniary loss requirement prevents a defendant from arguing
that although he obtained property of another by· deceptive
means with the intent to withhold that property permanently,
he is not guilty of theft by deception because the victim
suffered no pecuniary loss -- i.e., what the victim rec&ived
was equal in value to that with which he parted.

This

argument should not prevail -- see State v. Mills, 396 P.2d
at Bi People v. Pugh, 137 Cal. App. 2d 226, 233-234, 289
P.2d 826, 829-830 (1955) -- but apparently would under the
standard set forth in Johnson.

Cf.

State v. Forshee, 588

P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1978) (holding that "the degree of
[theft] must be measured by the value of the property
obtained by the defendant as a result of the deception,
rather than the value of any property received by the
victim" (footnote omitted) ) •

The requirement that the

victim lose something of value, Johnson, 663 P.2d at SO, is
satisfied when he does not receive what he bargained for.
Certainly, there is some inherent value, although not
necessarily quantifiable financial value, in being able to
rely on the representations made by another and actually
-16-

receiving what one bargained for before parting with one's
property.

See United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d

cir. 1932); PERKINS AND BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 382.

POINT II
IF THIS COURT DOES NOT ABANDON THE PECUNIARY
LOSS REQUIREMENT ANNOUNCED IN STATE v. JOHNSON,
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON PECUNIARY LOSS WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR; HOWEVER, IF THAT REQUIREMENT
IS ABANDONED, SUCH AN INSTRUCTION WAS NOT
NECESSARY.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
ON "PUFFING;" ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR IN
THAT REGARD WAS HARMLESS.
0

Defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to give his Requested
Instruction No. 2, which read:
The crime of theft by deception is not
established in the absence of evidence showing,
or tending to show, that the claimed victim has
sustained a pecuniary or property loss by reason
of the transaction relied upon.
(R. 56).

Defendant took exception to this refusal (R. 463).

No similar instruction was given (R. 66-82).
As noted by defendant, State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33
(Utah 1980), makes clear that failure to instruct on a basic
element of the crime charged generally constitutes
reversible error.

If this Court follows its conclusion in

State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983), that
pecuniary loss on the part of the victim is an essential
element of the crime of theft by deception, in light of
the State cannot seriously argue that reversal is not
required in

case for failure to give defendant's
-17-

RPquested Instruction No. 2.
However, if the Court abandons the pecuniary loss
rule announced in Johnson and adopts the majority rule,
which as suggested above is the better course, the trial
court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction
was not error because proving pecuniary loss to the victim
is not an essential element of theft by deception.

For the

reasons stated above, this Court should adopt th·e majority
rule and hold that the trial court did not err in refusing
to give

Requested Instruction No. 2
Finally, defendant argues that the trial

erred in refusing to give his Requested Instruciton No. 6,
which read:
Theft by deception does not occur, and you
must return a verdict of not guilty, when there
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary
significance, or puffing by statements unlikely
to deceive ordinary persons in the group
addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
(R. 60).

Defendant took exception to this refusal (R. 464),

and no similar instruction was given (R. 66-82).

Although

this requested instruction is a verbatim recitation of
§

76-6-405(2), it does not appear to be relevant to the

facts as presented at trial, by either party.

There was no

evidence that defendant was guilty only of "puffing."

His

theory of the case throughout trial was that the transaction
between him and Ms. Marlowe was a sale of property where
each party received value for value (R. 436).

-18-

Therefore,

his Requested Instruction No. 6 was irrelevant and
unnecessary.

Cf.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 160 (Utah

19 33); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) -cases which stand for the proposition that the defendant's
theory of defense may preclude the giving of an instruction
he requests.
Alternatively, if this Court determines that the
trial court erred in not giving defendant's Requested
Instruction No. 6, the error was harmless, in that even
without the error there was not "a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result fo'r the defendant.•

State v.

Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), quoting State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982).

See also Rule

30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann.
77-35-30(a)

§

(1982)).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

30

day of January,

19 8 5.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

--

DAVE B. THOMPSO;-._.,
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO __3._
The essential elements of the crime charged in
the information are as follows:
1.

That the defendant obtained or exercised control

over the property of
2.

tli r i am Marlowe.

That the obtaining of or the control over said

property, if any, was by deception.
3.

That the value of said property exceeded $1,000.00.

4. /That at the time of such control, if any, the
defendant had a
5.

-

to deprive the owner of such property.

I

That $UC.fi-Gontrol, if any, occurred on or about

the 15th day ofF.pril, 1982,'at Utah County, State of Utah.

J

If the state has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential
elements of the crime charged, you must acquit the defendant.
But if the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a
doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as above
set forth. the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in
the information.

_)1I

I:\STRUCTION NO.

__,,5_

As used in these instructions, the following
words or phrases are defined as follows:
(1)

"Property" means anything of value including

(2)

"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to

i71(lfl€)'.

bring about a transfer of possession, whether to the obtainer
or another.
(3)

"Purpose to deprive" means to have the

conscious object to withhold property permanently.
(4)

Deception occurs when a person intention-

ally:
"promises perforrr.ance that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction, which performance
the actor does not ·intend to perform or knows will not
be performed; provided, however, that the failure to
perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent (not to perform) or knowledge (that it will not
be performed) is not sufficient proof that the actor
did not intend to perforffi or knew the promise would
not be performed."

